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Is the Lightbulb Still On? Social Representations of Creativity 
in a Western Context 
Vlad Petre Glaveanu 
London School of Economics, USA 
 
The present article aims to explore the social representations of creativity in a 
Western cultural context. In doing so it starts by addressing the theoretical bases 
for such an investigation and especially the more developed literature on implicit 
theories of creativity. Contributions of the social representations approach are 
discussed, in particular the mechanisms of anchoring and objectification and pro-
cesses of thematisation. The empirical research was based on an on-line survey and 
the analysis included 106 responses, mainly from participants living in the US and 
the UK. The questionnaire employed both closed and open-ended questions 
concerning: a) common creativity symbols; b) existing dichotomies about the 
nature of creativity, and c) self-evaluations of creativity. Participants were first 
asked to think of what would be the best creativity symbol for them and to rate and 
comment on eight symbols emerging out of a pre-study of Google Images. 
Findings indicate that current representations of creativity are complex and multi-
faceted and the strongest association present was between creativity and the arts 
(especially symbols like paintbrush and colour, children’s drawings, etc.). This has 
several important practical implications for how creativity is understood, recog-
nised and legitimated in everyday contexts.  
 
 
We live in a world where creativity is fashionable, is desirable, and embodies, at least 
in Western cultures, the necessity and universality of a true social value (see Mason, 
2003). And yet, what is creativity? What do psychologists mean when using the term? 
What about managers, teachers, art critics, etc.? Unfortunately, even after several 
decades of research, many would probably agree with Borofsky (2001, p. 69) that 
“grasping creativity is like trying to catch the wind”. Despite this fundamental am-
biguity and inherent complexity of the phenomenon, creativity is something we com-
ment on, we ‘discover’ in and around us, we even make comparative judgements 
about. Since creativity basically deals with the emergence of the ‘new’, of the 
‘unfamiliar’, its outcomes and processes are unavoidably accompanied by collective 
meaning-making efforts. The social representation of creativity, as shall be argued in 
this article, has deep roots in social interactions among different actors of the public 
sphere, each and every one of us being, at some point or another, confronted with 
questions such as ‘What is and what is not creative?’  
The present article reports on a research aiming to uncover the social representation 
of creativity. As such it will start with a theoretical discussion concerning social 
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representations and their points of (dis)connection with what is known as implicit 
theories of creativity. An argument will be made that looking at creativity as a social 
representation enriches both our understanding of the phenomenon and extends our 
practical means of studying it. The research discussed here uses several insights 
affored by a social representations approach and explores creativity symbols and their 
relation with more general beliefs about creativity and with self-evaluations. In so 
doing it is hoped that a new contextual and more comprehensive view of what 
creativity is for ‘laypeople’ and in the everyday (at least in a Western context) will 
emerge.   
 
THEORETICAL LENSES 
The importance of studying laypeople’s conceptions of creativity has relatively 
recently been acknowledged by researchers who, for the most part, focused on the 
nature of the creative process and its enhancement (Spiel & von Korff, 1998). In the 
past three decades though ideas about social agreement, the attribution of creativity 
and its individual and collective representation became salient and today we can find 
a fairly well-developed body of literature on ‘implicit theories of creativity’. None-
theless, folk conceptions of creativity have rarely been discussed from a more social 
and cultural perspective, such as the theory of social representations. Theoretical and 
empirical arguments will be offered for why this situation should be reconsidered. 
From implicit theories... 
The study of implicit theories is not restricted to creativity, not even to psychology 
itself, given that it represents a wide area of investigation for most social sciences 
(Furnham, 1988). Implicit theories are largely considered to be poorly articulated, to 
constitute core assumptions that construct reality and provide frameworks for thought 
and action (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). In a more recent formulation by Runco and 
Johnson (2002, p. 427), they are defined as “the constellations of thoughts and ideas 
about a particular construct that are held and applied by individuals”. As such, 
implicit theories can and should be understood in their relation to ‘explicit theories’, 
considered to be formal, logical, testable, and created by scientists. A great and 
somehow artificial divide between laypeople and scientists is therefore set at the very 
core of an implicit theories approach. 
Moreover, the mere distinction between ‘implicit’ and explicit’ becomes problem-
atic under further scrutiny. To take an example, in his 1999 chapter on implicit 
theories, Mark Runco describes them in different ways: as belonging to laypeople, as 
personal, as often unshared and non-articulated (in contrast to explicit theories). This 
understanding generally permeates his extensive work on the topic (see also Runco, 
2007, p. 186). Many of these assumptions are however contradicting previous con-
ceptualisations, such as that of Robert Sternberg who, in 1985, more generously 
defined implicit theories as constructions of people in general, useful in formulating 
“common-cultural views” (so necessarily shared), and studied by looking at people’s 
communications (hence implicit theories need to be articulated in some form). The 
implicit–explicit opposition is therefore more blurred than current depictions would 
make us believe and clear-cut distinctions, such as science versus common sense, 
often lead to an over-simplification. As Furnham (1988, p. 7) readily admitted, “lay 
theories overlap with scientific theories; they function in similar ways, indeed the one 
may be seen as an outgrowth of the other”. 
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Despite theoretical debates, the actual research on implicit theories of creativity has 
known a considerable expansion in the past years and most studies use a social 
validation method to uncover the structure of lay beliefs. This procedure (see Runco, 
1989; 1999) implies two stages: first an open-ended exploration of what is considered 
‘creative’ by a certain group, followed by the construction of a checklist used to 
collect more quantitative data from an equivalent, often larger group. Research on 
implicit theories based on methodologies similar to the one described here has been 
conducted using various populations, from parents and teachers, to managers and 
even scientists (Karwowski, 2010; Runco, 1989; Runco & Bahleda, 1986; Runco & 
Johnson, 2002; Sternberg, 1985; Wickes & Ward, 2006), including from a cross-
cultural perspective (Chan & Chan, 1999; Lim & Plucker, 2001).  
The interest in implicit theories among creativity researchers is increasing and it is 
alimented by both theoretical and practical considerations. At a theoretical level it is 
hoped that an understanding of implicit theories may help to refine and develop our 
current scientific or ‘explicit’ theories of creativity, to make them more realistic and 
to broaden their scope (Chan & Chan, 1999; Runco & Bahleda, 1986; Sternberg, 
1985). Perhaps even more important, implicit theories are studied for their practical 
relevance. Their value is twofold: in relation to evaluations and in relation to actual 
behaviour. Implicit theories play a great role in how we assess creativity in ourselves 
and others (Wickes & Ward, 2006). This is by no means inconsequential since 
holding an implicit theory connects to a certain expectation and expectations in-
fluence behaviours (Runco, 2007). Implicit theories are similar to standards we come 
to use and, from this perspective, they have the power to either inhibit or facilitate 
creative expression (Runco & Johnson, 2002). In sum, they “define how we think and 
behave with regard to creativity” (Wickes & Ward, 2006, p. 138).  
... to social representations 
The same assumptions about the evaluative and behavioural consequences of lay 
beliefs are emphasised by social representation theorists. From the pioneering study 
of Serge Moscovici (1961) on psychoanalysis in the French society, the theory of 
social representations took shape as a theory of social knowledge, moreover, a theory 
concerned with the transformation of knowledge as it ‘travels’ through different com-
munities and social milieus. Representation in this context is said to constitute the 
basis of all our knowledge systems (Jovchelovitch, 2007, p. 2) and, as such, to make 
up our reality and the reality of the world around us (Duveen, 2007; Moscovici, 2000). 
Representations are, at once, symbolic and social in their origin and expression. Once 
created, “they are autonomous” and “evolve beyond the reach of individuals” 
(Philogène & Deaux, 2001, p. 6). Representations are bound to social contexts and, 
just as the later exist in such a multitude, so is our knowledge defined by plurality and 
heterogeneity. Last but not least, identities are also built on a foundation of social 
representations (Breakwell, 2001) and it is argued that “social representations and 
social identities must be seen as two sides of the same coin” (Howarth, 2007, p. 133). 
Until the present moment, social representations have been studied in a variety of 
contexts and related to a diversity of social objects (for a review see Jovchelovitch, 
2007), and yet there is still a scarcity of studies that bring together creativity and 
social representations (Lancciano, De Caroli, Castiglione, & Sagone, 2010; Magio-
glou, 2008). Perhaps the clearest attempts to reunite the two belong to the field of 
giftedness research. Tavani, Zenasni and Pereira-Fradin (2009) investigated the social 
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representations of gifted children. In addition to actual studies, it has also been 
suggested that the evaluation of creativity should be based on an examination of 
social representations and experiences of creativity in different cultures (Häyrynen, 
2009). On the whole, the literature on social representations of creativity is under-
developed, especially by comparison to that on implicit theories. A necessary ques-
tion arises in this context: aren’t we in fact studying the same realities under different 
names? 
The answer to this is yes and no. Yes to the extent that, indeed, the results of 
implicit theories studies can be said to uncover social forms of representation. No if 
we consider the different epistemological considerations that seem to underpin the 
two kinds of investigation. To elaborate on this second aspect, it became obvious 
from the above that implicit theories are often said to be “personal rather than shared” 
(Runco, 1999, p. 27), to “reside in the minds” of individuals, “in people’s heads” 
(Sternberg, 1985), although not in a complete social vacuum. Contrary to this view, 
the social representations approach would emphasise the fact that representations of 
creativity emerge out of a space of inter-subjectivity and though different kinds of 
social interaction. In the words of Sandra Jovchelovitch (1996), social representations 
are never the solitary products of an individual mind, although they might find 
expression in individual minds. This distinction is paramount, since conceptualising 
implicit theories as social representations opens up a whole new world of questions 
implicit theory researchers seem not to be very preoccupied with: How do lay beliefs 
emerge in macro and micro-level social interaction? How is it that individuals come 
to ‘acquire’ certain representations? How does an individual engage with dominant 
forms of representation? How are identities ‘forged’ in these representational fields? 
etc. In essence: If implicit theories are in the individual mind where do they come 
from, what explains their variations and, more importantly, their transformation?    
And yet, there are also many points of connection between implicit theories and 
social representations. In fact, some authors like Romo and Alfonso (2003) have 
defined implicit theories as “social knowledge schemas” (p. 410). Even more, the 
very purpose of implicit theories seems to be matching that of social representations: 
to make the world more stable, orderly, predictable, and understandable (Furnham, 
1988, p. 19). Even methodologically there are many similarities between implicit 
theories studies and traditional social representations research. For instance the use of 
different groups of respondents (see Spiel & von Kroff, 1988; Sternberg, 1988), 
which allows for an appreciation of the context-dependent nature of creativity beliefs. 
This is why it could be agreed that much of the work on implicit theories is relevant 
for our understanding of the social representation of creativity. What then would be 
the contribution of social representations theory to the general literature?      
The social representing of creativity  
To inquire about the social representing of creativity with the conceptual tools 
offered by the theory of social representations could help illuminate how representa-
tions of this kind take shape and function in society. It is to be noted that what is 
referred to here is the representation of ‘creativity’ per se, and not of the ‘creative 
person’ particularly (something previously studied as well by Spiel and von Korff, 
1988). 
One of the reasons why creativity should be studied as a representation is the 
function social representations are said to have, that of making something unfamiliar, 
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even unfamiliarity itself, familiar (Moscovici, 2000, p. 37). And what can be more 
unfamiliar than creativity, the process by which unfamiliarity itself emerges? The 
seemingly unpredictability of creativity can be most unsettling for individuals, groups 
and even societies, and calls for constant representational efforts. The theory of social 
representation suggests what these efforts might consist of. Moscovici, in his seminal 
writing on ‘The Phenomenon of Social Representations” (2000, pp. 41-54; originally 
published in 1984), discusses the inter-related processes of anchoring and objectifica-
tion. Anchoring, often reflected in naming and classifying, takes place when a strange 
reality is reduced to ordinary categories and images, is in other words set in a familiar 
context. Objectifying complements this by turning the abstract (almost) concrete, 
‘saturating’ the idea of unfamiliarity with reality, making it physical and accessible. 
As Moscovici (2000, p. 49) describes it, “to objectify is to discover the iconic quality 
of an imprecise idea or being, to reduce a concept in an image”. These processes can 
easily be illustrated by the case of creativity where anchoring (in a certain domain, for 
example the arts) is supported by objectifications (the emblematic Guernica by 
Picasso, The Persistence of Memory by Dali, etc.), which vary according to social 
groups and historical times.  
However, the logic of anchoring and objectification, and therefore the production 
of representations, is not random. Its constraints have to do on the one hand with the 
inherent characteristics of the human mind, and on the other with larger social, 
cultural and historical contexts. Both these aspects are taken into account in more 
recent discussions about themata and thematisation. Ivana Marková (2003) considers 
as the fundamental characteristic of human thinking, language and communication the 
quality of being based on oppositional dichotomies (e.g., individual/society, freedom/ 
oppression, justice/injustice, etc). It is such oppositions that, when thematised in 
public discourses, become the engine behind the construction of social representations. 
Science expresses themata in the form of scholarly debates between different orien-
tations or schools of thought. In the creativity literature for instance we often find 
polarities like: children creativity–adult creativity, creativity as domain-general or 
domain-specific, etc. (see the discussions by Sawyer and colleagues, 2003). Naturally, 
common-sense functions following similar principles and it is repeatedly the case that 
scientific themata originate from lay thinking (Marková, 2003, p. 184). However, as 
argued by Marková, themata in common sense are frequently dormant and become 
active only in the course of social or even historical events when established concep-
tions are challenged either because new realities emerge or existing constructions 
become obsolete. These kinds of situations are very common in everyday life where 
the ‘creative’ needs to be defended or separated from the ‘uncreative’. 
These ideas have many practical implications, several of which concern research 
methodologies. If representations are created in the course of communication and co-
operation (Moscovici, 2000), then we would need to look for representations of 
creativity in everyday discussion, in the media and in scientific discourses (Häyrynen, 
2009, p. 292). The link between science and common-sense is in fact of maximal 
importance for the theory of social representation as Moscovici’s original project on 
psychoanalysis has shown. Similar to the notions of ‘unconscious’ or ‘repression’ in 
the case of psychoanalysis, psychological constructs like ‘intelligence’ or ‘creativity’ 
“shuttle between the everyday talk and scholarly discussion, and bear traces of the 
former discussion when entering, for example, from everyday public treatment into 
scientific articulation” (Häyrynen, 2009, p. 293). The ethos of social representations 
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research is not to consider lay conceptions as ‘biases’ and compare them to scientific–
and therefore ‘truthful’–depictions (as it sometimes happens in implicit theories 
research), but to understand each and every construction in its own right.   
 
METHOD 
The research reported in this article is exploratory in nature and had the general aim 
of uncovering social representations of creativity among laypeople (non-creativity 
researchers) in Western countries. 
Participants 
The on-line survey designed for the research was answered by 118 respondents (by 
10th of September 2010). The major eligibility criterion was for participants to be 
nationals of Western countries (for greater cultural homogeneity) or to have lived in a 
Western country for at least five years. After excluding non-eligible participants and 
incomplete responses, 106 participants were kept in the final data analysis. Over a 
half of them (57.5%) were from the United States and a third (30.2%) from the United 
Kingdom so it can be considered that the results reflect by and large an Anglo-Saxon 
cultural context. About three quarters of the respondents were females (76.4%) and 
the mean age for the sample was around 28 (ages ranging from 16 to 63). Most res-
pondents had finished higher education at either a post-graduate (33%) or graduate 
(20.8%) level, followed by secondary level/high-school (34.9%). A third of the 
respondents (30.2%) were not studying at the moment of the survey and those 
enrolled in education reflected a variety of disciplines, most notably psychology 
(25.5% of the whole sample). Finally, more than half of the participants (57.5%) were 
employed (just 5 working in Arts and Creative Industries).  
Materials and design 
The research instrument was a questionnaire created by the researcher. The design of 
the questionnaire was guided by a social representations approach and combined 
closed questions (ratings on Likert scales) with open-ended questions (allowing a 
better understanding of meaning-making processes). As previously argued, some 
important premises of social representations theory and research are the following: 
1. Social representations are often ‘objectified’ or ‘materialised’ in  
concrete, even physical forms in public discourses; 
2. Social representations are ‘anchored’ in bodies of previous know- 
ledge that can often exist antinomically, as part of larger themata; 
3. Social representations are linked with identity processes and therefore 
with the positioning of the self in relation to the object of represen-
tation. 
Considering the fact that a study of ‘objectified’ depictions of creativity offers 
probably one of the best ways to start exploring broader patterns of representation, the 
present research centred on evaluations of ‘common’ creativity symbols. Respondents 
were first asked to think of what the best symbol of creativity would be for them and 
to explain their choice. Then they were shown eight potential creativity symbols, 
asked to rate them on how well they represent creativity, and comment on their link to 
the idea of creativity. A second part of the survey invited respondents to rate, separa-
tely, the importance of several factors for creativity: heredity, environment, origina-
lity, social value, perspiration, inspiration, domain-generality, and domain-specificity. 
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These factors form in effect dichotomies that underpin key debates in the literature 
and help scientists (and potentially laypeople as well) to ‘anchor’ the unfamiliar 
reality of the creative process in larger bodies of signification by means of definition 
and classification. Finally, self-positioning was also studied by asking respondents to 
appreciate what percentage of people in the general population could be considered 
creative, to rate their own overall creativity, explain the rating and mention their 
biggest creative achievement to date. The survey ended with questions collecting 
demographic information. It is to be noted that all ratings mentioned above were 
made on seven-point Likert scales (where 1 was associated with low suitability or im-
portance and 7 with high suitablility or importance) and that all explanations and 
comments were captured through open-ended questions.    
Certainly one of the most important decisions to be made in designing the research 
instrument had to do with selecting creativity symbols. Since the process of objectifi-
cation lends representations an almost material form it was decided that pictorial 
depictions related to creativity in different kinds of public media needed to be 
explored. One of the most readily available ‘databases’ for such depictions is of 
course the Internet and therefore a pre-study was conducted using the Google Images 
(UK) search engine on the 23rd of January 2010. The first 500 images have been 
selected when typing the word ‘creativity’ and 43 of these excluded due to repetition. 
The 457 images left were subjected to content analysis. Images were not coded as a 
whole so double/multiple coding was not uncommon. The most frequent symbols 
(appearing at least more than once) were: lightbulb (29), brain (15), paintbrush and 
colours (12), computer (10), toy (9), musical note (8), children’s drawings (7), jigsaw 
puzzle (6), photo cameras (5), images of leaders or recognised creators (5), butterfly 
(6), lock and/or key (4), star (4), coloured crayons (3), flower (3), birth/growth (3), 
images of flying (3), ship (2), Earth (2), bottle (2). A decision was made to select all 
elements with a frequency above five and so a manageable number of eight symbols 
were included in the questionnaire (lightbulb, brain, paintbrush and colours, computer, 
toy, musical note, children’s drawings, and jigsaw puzzle). It must be specified that 
respondents were prompted with verbal formulations and not with images and the 
order of presentation was randomised in the survey. 
Procedure  
Participants were “invited to participate in a survey on creativity that focuses on crea-
tivity symbols, beliefs about creativity and personal creative expression”. They were 
informed about their rights, the risks and benefits of participation, and their consent 
was recorded. The study was advertised on several on-line research websites (in UK 
and US), and collected data starting February 2010. No material compensation was 
given for participation. 
 
RESULTS 
The results of this research are presented in two sections. The current section looks at 
the main findings (generally quantitative) following the succession of the questions 
asked in the survey. An important observation is that non-parametric statistics have 
been employed for data analysis considering the ordinal nature of Likert scales and 
the fact that ratings presented deviations from normality. The data discussed in the 
next section explores the ‘symbolic universe’ of creativity more closely by focusing 
on participant interpretations (qualitative data) and relating, whenever possible, lay-
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people’s conceptions to the scientific literature on creativity. Depending mostly on 
the respondent’s rating, associated qualitative answers were primarely grouped into 
favourable (for ratings of 5, 6, and 7), unfavourable (for ratings of 1, 2, and 3) and 
undecided (for ratings of 4). All answers in these preliminary categories were listed 
and a synthesis of main points was made by the researcher for each and illustrated 
with what were judged to be the most representative verbatim formulations. Many of 
them are included hereafter as direct quoatations without a specified author.  
The survey was opened by asking respondents to think of what would be the ‘best 
creativity symbol’ for them and explain their choice. Main categories are presented in 
Figure 1 (some responses were double coded). As can be noticed, most respondents 
mentioned symbols that have to do with artistic expression (paintbrush, colour, and 
palette). Other two well-represented classes of response were those of ‘abstract’ and 
‘natural’ symbols. Most abstract symbols chosen for creativity revolved around ideas 
of complexity, messiness, excitement and strangeness as well as “infinite possi-
bilities”. Examples here are: mobius strip, Celtic knot, squiggle, infinity sign, ques-
tion mark, Yin and Yang, cross, Vitruvian man, compass, prism, empty chair, etc. On 
the other hand, natural symbols were used to emphasise ideas of growth, mobility and 
change, the ordinariness and simplicity of creation. Common symbols in this cate-
gory: seed, flower, tree, rainbow, clouds, water, star, flame, humming bird or butter-
fly, blob of mercury, etc. Not remote from the idea of ‘natural’ symbols, and yet 
forming a clear category in itself, was the concept of brain or mind, associated with 
creativity in 12 of the responses. In the fifth position considering frequency, were 
writing objects (pen, pencil, crayon, even paper or quill), suggesting associations with 
literary forms of creativity but also chosen for their multifunctional nature (“Creative 
people doodle, draw, write and usually would use a pen to do so”). This category was 
followed by the lightbulb symbol with nine responses, a choice often justified by its 
predominance in popular culture. Manual work symbols emphasised the role of hands 
and connected creativity to crafts and everyday life activities. At last, music note and 
computer symbols where mentioned in two responses each. The ‘Other’ category in-
cluded symbols that didn’t fit the above, such as the dollar sign, autism, dance, etc. 
Standing out was the “no symbol” response and justification: “I don't think you could 
give creativity a symbol because anything could be one”. It is also interesting to note 
that five out of the eight most common creativity symbols from Google Images were 
also spontaneously generated by the respondents, which supports the ecological 
validity of using Internet databases for this kind of research tasks.  
When it came to rating the eight Google-generated creativity symbols on the 1 – 
“poor creativity symbol” to 7 – “great creativity symbol” scale, respondents generally 
appreciated ‘paintbrush and colours’ the most (mode 7), closely followed by ‘child-
ren’s drawings’ (mode 6). The ‘lightbulb’, ‘musical note’ and ‘brain’ symbols were 
slightly less appreciated (with modes of 5, 5 and 4 respectively) and ‘puzzle’, ‘toy’ 
and ‘computer’ were least appreciated in general (with modes of 2, 2 and 1 
respectively). Table 2 depicts the descriptive results for each symbol. A Friedman test 
was also conducted to determine whether participants had a differential rank ordered 
preference for the eight creativity symbols. Results indicated a significant difference, 
χ²(7)=214.25, p<.001. The following section will come back to these ratings and 
interpret them in light of the qualitative responses (participants were asked what they 
thought was the connection between symbol X and creativity). For the moment it is 
important to keep in mind the apparent preference for art related symbols (paintbrush 
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Figure 1. Categories of Creativity Symbols as Proposed by the Respondents 
 
and colours, children’s drawings, musical note) and the apparent dislike for more 
‘technical’ associations (with computers, puzzles, etc.) but also associations related 
exclusively to childhood (like toy). The brain and lightbulb symbols generally ob-
tained good ratings but there were also reservations about their capacity to reflect the 
‘true’ nature of creativity. Even more interesting, if we are to look at Spearman cor-
relation coefficients between the ratings of the eight symbols, we notice highly 
significant statistical correlations among the ‘triplet’ paintbrush and colours, child-
ren’s drawings and musical note (paintbrush and colours–children’s drawings: 
rs(104)=.438, p<0.001; paintbrush and colours–musical note: rs(104)=.344, p<0.001; 
children’s drawings–musical note: rs(104)=.378, p<0.001), but also among a ‘qua-
druple’ of lightbulb, brain, computer and puzzle (lightbulb–brain: rs(104)=.446, 
p<0.001; lightbulb–computer: rs(104)=.263, p=0.007; lightbulb–puzzle: rs(104)=.257, 
p=0.008; brain–computer: rs(104)=.391, p<0.001; brain–puzzle: rs(104)=.255, 
p=0.008; computer–puzzle: rs(104)=.345, p<0.001). Unsurprisingly, children’s 
drawings also significantly correlated with toy, but the correlation was a bit less 
strong (rs(104)=.248, p=0.01). This is already indicative of certain patterns of repre-
sentation in relation to creativity to be analysed more carefully in the next section.      
To help us clarify some of the general meanings associated with these symbols a 
further piece of information comes from the correlations symbol ratings had with the 
ratings of the eight factors concerning the nature of creativity. Before considering 
these and in order to first summarise the results ‘within’ pairs, let us note that the 
Wilcoxon test yield significant differences between the medians of heredity and social 
environment, Z=-3.72, p<0.001 (heredity mean of ranks 33.13, environment 46.52), 
of originality and social value, Z=-.611, p<0.001 (mean of ranks for originality 45.88, 
for social value 34.21), and of inspiration and perspiration, Z=-4.65, p<0.001 (mean 
of ranks for inspiration 40.73, perspiration 37.32). No significant difference was 
discovered between creativity in a specific domain versus creativity in general (Z=-
1.23, p=0.219). Hence, to begin with, our respondents’ representation of creativity 
emphasised originality, inspiration and the role of the social environment. In relation 
to the ratings of creativity symbols, it is important to observe that the paintbrush and 
colours ratings significantly and positively correlated with scores on heredity (rs(104)  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Results for Proposed Creativity Symbols:  
Frequencies for Each Likert Scale Point*, Median and Mode 
Creativity symbols 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Median Mode 
Lightbulb 4 10 17 16 29 14 16 5 5 
Brain 6 14 7 23 22 14 20 5 4 
Paintbrush and colour 1 5 9 14 25 23 29 5 7 
Computer 30 23 26 7 12 6 2 2.5 1 
Toy 11 27 21 19 18 5 5 3 2 
Musical note 4 16 17 14 23 18 14 5 5 
Jigsaw puzzle 18 24 20 15 18 10 1 3 2 
Children’s drawings 1 4 12 19 22 26 22 5 6 
* Where 1 is ‘very poor creativity symbol’ and 7 ‘excellent creativity symbol’. 
Note. Results based on the whole sample of 106 participants. 
 
=.295, p=0.002) and negatively with scores on the importance of social environment 
for creativity (rs(104)=-.228, p=0.19). This suggests that people who associate 
creativity mostly with artistic expression tend to consider it greatly influenced by 
heredity as well. Ratings for lightbulb correlated with those for inspiration (rs(104) 
=.204, p=0.036) and social value (rs(104)=.193, p=0.047). The first correlation is not 
surprising since the lightbulb itself, as we shall see, was appreciated as a symbol of 
inspiration, insight, and the ‘Aha!’ moment. Incidentally, ratings for brain also cor-
related with those for inspiration (rs(104)=.298, p=0.002). The second correlation in 
the case of the lightbulb symbol might be explained by an underlying connection with 
technology and in fact ratings for computer also correlated with social value (rs(104) 
=.289, p=0.003).    
The last part of the survey explored self-evaluations of creativity. The mean value 
for the general percentage of the population respondents consider to be creative was 
55.77 and their own evaluation of creativity had a median of 6 and a mode of 7 (on a 
seven-point Likert scale). Therefore one can conclude that participants in the study 
tended to see themselves as generally creative. Furthermore, the two ratings were 
positively correlated (rs(104)=.234, p=0.016), which means that persons who appre-
ciated themselves as more creative also thought more people from the general popula-
tion were creative. Equally, it should be noted that one of the few correlations these 
two had with the other variables has been with the ratings for creativity as domain-
specific; particularly for self-rating of creativity the correlation was significant 
(rs(104)=.270, p=0.005). This could perhaps suggest that people tended to see them-
selves as creative in particular domains rather than in each and every domain. There 
certainly are different ways of being creative and, when asked to comment on their 
self-creativity rating and to describe what they thought was their biggest creative 
achievement up to date, responses followed three main categories (single coding). 
The best represented was the artistic one (50% of the cases), with participants who 
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mentioned as creative achievement activities like: painting or drawing, writing essays 
or poems, composing music, dancing, being skilled at photography or an artistic craft, 
interested in film or sculpture. The scientific-professional activities category (19.8%) 
was represented by creative activities such as being admitted to or completing a PhD, 
writing an article or a book, coming up with new methods of scientific investigation, 
having innovative business initiatives, etc. Finally, the everyday life creativity class of 
responses, accounting for about a third of the responses (30.2%), was illustrated by: 
decorating a room or a house, raising a family, solving problems and organising daily 
activities, creating a personal style, improvising in cooking, creating unique gifts, 
having a sense of humour and also feeling creative as a person. What is salient here as 
well is yet another indication of how significant art is for the representation of crea-
tivity and how it can be said to constitute the most potent ‘anchor’ for understanding 
creativity (both in general and for the creative expression of the self). 
Interpreting the results: The symbolic universe of creativity 
A classic social representations analysis would be incomplete without paying atten-
tion to the actual reasons behind people’s preferences, as expressed in their own 
words. Exploring the ‘symbolic universe’ of creativity means exactly that: focusing 
not only on the structure but also on the texture of the responses, and this is accom-
plished by having a closer look at how participants create and/or comment on crea-
tivity symbols. The open task of choosing their own symbol suggested that creativity, 
as the ultimate ‘unfamiliar’, is anchored in a variety of domains and seen through a 
multitude of lenses. Most often these had to do with the arts, especially drawing and 
painting, but also with abstractions, with nature, with the human brain, with manual 
work, etc. It can be concluded, just from this series of answers, that creativity is mul-
tiply anchored and objectified in laypeople’s representations. This testifies to the 
richness and complexity of the phenomenon, something creativity researchers are 
confronted with themselves. The various connections between ‘lay’ and ‘scientific’ 
thinking, between ‘lay’ and ‘scientific’ concerns and dilemmas, will also become 
clearer as follows. 
Paintbrush and colours – Musical note 
These two symbols have both to do with art and although both could be said to have 
been appreciated by respondents, it was clearly the paintbrush and colours that gained 
their preference more. Behind the positive ratings of these symbols lays a strong 
association between art and creativity: “when someone is good with art, people will 
often label them as creative”, “art is a field founded almost completely in creativity”, 
“when people think of creativity, art is usually one of the first things they associate it 
with”, etc. These kinds of associations seem to have deep cultural and historical roots, 
located by some authors as far back as ancient Greece (Friedman & Rogers, 1998). 
The connection tends to be even stronger in the case of the paintbrush and colours 
symbol, as both ratings and comments have shown. This was considered the “typical 
symbol for creativity” since “painting is what many people think of as a major and 
important type of creativity”. By comparison, comments for musical note described it 
as creative because it is “one of the arts”, and not necessarily the prototypical form of 
art.  
Why is art creative? The analysis of responses offers grounds for understanding 
this. To begin with, art is a form of self-expression. Moreover, this expression is fun-
damentally free, and open to “endless possibilities” (“a creative person can create 
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anything with a paintbrush and colors”; “the possibilities are endless with musical 
notes”, etc.). It also connects with emotions and emotionality and this was seen as a 
requirement for creative production. “A note”, it was said, “can mean anything, 
happiness, sadness, empathy, knowledge, even danger. It can be put anywhere on a 
measure line and mean something totally different”. This is why artistic expression 
was also considered to reflect the uniqueness of the person. Finally, drawing and 
painting particularly are activities many people considered to reflect “the actual mak-
ing of something”. Creativity is very much related to material outcomes and pro-
cesses of physical labour.  
And yet, even these acclaimed symbols did not escape criticism, most of all for not 
representing the whole of creativity. Paintbrush and colours and musical notes have 
also been thought of as: “context specific and limited”, a “disciplined aspect of crea-
tivity” or “only one aspect of it”, “a very narrow conception of creativity”, “stereo-
typical and restrictive”, etc. Summing up, the idea emerged that “creativity is much 
more than just having a talent” and also that “there is more to creativity than art”. 
Further critiques were expressed for the musical note symbol as somehow contradict-
ing the freedom that is specific for true creativity. Since music is written with notes, 
they are “the discipling of music, the antithesis of creativity”, a “plan of sound that 
has been followed”, “a very rigid and controlled form of musical expression”. But 
perhaps the strongest arguments raised against this particular symbol had to do with 
the fact that the mere interpretation of music is basically uncreative. In the words of 
one of the respondents: “I am not very musical, but at school I learned to read music 
and add chords using a method without any creativity”. By contrast: “Musicians, 
especially composers, spontaneously create improvised melody. I'd say that's crea-
tive!” Distinctions such as these are also raised in the scientific literature and authors 
like Umberto Eco would certainly argue for the creativity of each ‘interpretation’ 
since every work of art “is effectively open to a virtually unlimited range of possible 
readings” (Eco, 1989, p. 21).  
In the end there seems to be an acknowledged relation between the arts of painting 
and music (music notes were compared with colour blobs). Both notes and colours 
are “tools for creativity”, and perhaps their most important virtue as creativity sym-
bols rests in the fact that they represent “something that all cultures and most indivi-
duals can relate to and readily understand”. 
Children’s drawings – Toy 
These two symbols are, in essence, both related to children and childhood and yet 
their ratings contrasted greatly. While children’s drawings were generally appreciated 
as a very good symbol for creativity, this was not so much the case for toy. It might 
be that the former was again associated with artistic expression and, in fact, paint-
brush and colours and children’s drawings seem to be most preferred by comparison 
to the other depictions. A quick look at the qualitative answers supports such as a 
supposition. Again references were made to the arts (“anytime you draw you are crea-
tive”) and also to imagination (“drawing images from one’s imagination is a creative 
act”). But it should be noted though that, in the case of both symbols, most of the 
comments had to do with children and their creativity. 
It might well be the case that children’s creativity represents a themata in common-
sense thinking because there appear to be two opposing views on this matter, both 
supported by a series of arguments. On the one hand, and for most respondents, child-
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ren were the actual embodiment of creativity; they “always have a creative mind” and 
“are some of the most creative beings”. Why is that? Because children are “un-
inhibited”, “open to all possible ideas or solutions”, “are less self-conscious” and 
“have the innocence and the imagination to create”. They also “have a different 
perception on reality”, “various views of the world” and are “less constrained by what 
society wants”. As such they “are not afraid or discouraged to show what they want”, 
“not yet restrained by convention”. Their “open minds” and “wild imaginations” 
make drawing or playing unique since “the same child will never produce two similar 
drawings, because their creativity explores different paths”. In most of these accounts 
there was an explicit dichotomy at work between children and adults, who are more 
“logical”, more “closed-minded” and much more connected to the real world (“adults 
feel much more constrained by the fact that their picture isn't a good representation of 
the real world”). Consequently, “the best creative minds, whatever the ideas they are 
working on, are those that can continue to be open, playful, experimental, questioning 
and flexible like a child’s”, or, in other words, “the child within all of us is the part 
which longs to create and come up with answers to all things”. Such statements are in 
fact mirrored in the scientific literature, and Freud himself made a parallel between 
children at play and creative writers (Freud, 1970, pp. 126-127, in original 1908).   
Faced with such compelling statements could anyone doubt the creativity of 
children? Some of the respondents actually did, and they problematised this by asking 
if creativity isn’t actually developed “in older age” and if children’s drawings don’t 
stand for “less creative, more creation to come”. As one of the participants put it: 
“often children lack the technical ability to bring their creativity into fruition of a real 
product, so it is only a moderately good symbol for creativity”. A strikingly similar 
argument has been advocated for in the creativity literature by Mihaly Csikszent-
mihalyi (in Sawyer et al., 2003, p. 223) who argued that creativity needs to have an 
effect on culture and children can almost never achieve that. Other authors noticed the 
same contradictions if and when we operate with this kind of definition for creativity 
(Cohen & Ambrose, 1999, p. 11). Furthermore, children are not always creative or 
can easily become uncreative if, for example, “a drawing is something a teacher tells 
the child to make”. “Children draw creatively until we stifle their creativity” is has 
been said, again echoing larger debates about the ‘creativity slump’ in school (see 
Lubart, 2003). Finally, questions were raised in the case of the toy symbol whether 
children’s play is always creative. In this case many considered it as depending on the 
toy since “some toys encourage creativity more than others”. This further connects to 
scientific concerns since the traditional view in child’s psychology was that play en-
courages an “autistic” mode of thought (see Harris, 2000, p. 188) and “the question of 
whether play is necessarily creative (or, indeed, whether creativity is necessarily 
playful) is a persistent one” (Banaji, Burn, & Buckingham, 2006, p. 35). 
Brain – Computer 
The brain and the computer are both highly complex systems, the former being the 
highest achievement of the natural world, the latter probably the greatest triumph of 
human thinking. This was well acknowledged in participants’ comments where, for 
example, the computer has been catalogued as “an artificial brain”. And yet, by and 
large, these two were not the most popular symbols for creativity and both were 
generally accused of being, in essence, “machines”, rather associated with other 
psychological functions than creativity: “thoughts”, “learning”, “problem solving ac-
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tivities”, “idea processing”, “logic”, “rationality”, “science”, “intelligence”, “techno-
logical/scientific creativity”, in one word, hard and cold cognitive processes and 
outcomes. Considering though the different nature of brains and computers, both 
positive and negative views tended to be more specific as follows. 
Brains were seen as a relatively good creativity symbol (at least compared to 
computers) and there was a large consensus among participants who supported this 
symbol that the brain is the one doing the creating: it is creativity’s “place and motor”, 
its “source”, a “necessary” condition, it “allows creativity”, it is “behind” it, it is 
“where creativity takes place”, where it “comes”, “originates”, “steams from”. Sum-
ming up, the brain “controls creativity”, creativity “involves using brainpower” so 
“you need to be able to use your brain in order to be creative”. Consequently, “with-
out brains, there wouldn’t be any creativity”. Such strong claims characterise lay 
thinking perhaps more than scientific thinking where, for example, neurological 
studies of creativity (see Martindale, 1999) are a growing field but without (yet) the 
claim that they could explain creativity away. In fact, although “the possibilities are 
promising, we are not anywhere near the point of being able to image the creative 
process as it unfolds in the human brain” (Hennesey & Amabile, 2010, p. 574). 
Similar reservations were also expressed by some of the respondents who considered 
the brain as the beginning of creativity but certainly “not the whole story”. Moreover, 
we all have a brain but we are not all creative: “creativity all comes from the brain... 
but so does everything else”. The brain may well be “the powerhouse of all though” 
but, at the end of the day, it is “merely tissue with potential (or sometimes, a lack 
thereof)”. 
If brains were considered to be an integral part of the story when it comes to 
creativity, computers were oftentimes completely excluded from it. The main reason: 
a computer “can only do things you tell it to do”, they strictly follow “programmed 
instructions”, are “constrained to rules”, and “can only manipulate facts”. This is radi-
cally opposed to a vision of creativity as random generation, fluidity and flexi-bility, 
emotion and self-expression. In the end, “electronics and creativity don't really mix–
there is only one way to access the Internet, to use Excel or other programs”. The 
natural reaction for some of the respondents when faced with this symbol was to be 
intrigued: “how can a machine symbolize something as deeply human as creativity??” 
and “Can creativity really be replicated in computers?” These kinds of interrogations 
are not uncommon in the scientific literature either (see Runco, 2007). Directly 
interested in computational systems, authors like Margaret Boden (1994, p. 84) would 
answer that yes, they can certainly help us understand how human creativity is 
possible, to a certain point can appear to be creative and even appear to recognise 
creativity. These ideas are generally not widespread among laypersons, although 
occasionally some would say that “a computer in itself is a product of creativity as 
well as a major tool for creativity, especially today”. Indeed, looking at the ‘bright’ 
side of the associations between computers and creativity, there is a sense that 
computers are valuable tools for creative expression, especially when it comes to 
graphics, design, multimedia, image creation, etc. They “open up opportunities” and 
also “limitless capabilities” for their users. Nonetheless, this point was also counter-
acted by the belief that: “You can do many creative things with a computer. But you 
can do many more non-creative things”. Computers can promote “uniform thinking” 
and be “equally used to waste away time and energy as they are used to discover”. All 
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things considered, their connection to creativity seems to be either bluntly rejected or 
constantly scrutinised.  
Lightbulb – Jigsaw puzzle  
The lightbulb and the puzzle are also connected (as the quantitative analysis has 
shown) in some ways with the symbolism of brain and computer. Indeed when one 
looks at the qualitative responses, associations with cognitive processes are pre-
dominant. The lightbulb, a classical symbol of insight (Runco, 2007, p. 21), was 
generally recognised by lay respondents as associated with ideas and idea generation 
in particular, the “Eureka” or “Aha! moment”, sudden thoughts, illumination and in-
spiration. Intellectual kinds of association are also specific for the jigsaw puzzle, seen 
as connected to intelligence, problem solving skills, “logical and practical thinking”, 
and even “mathematics” and the “brain”. And yet, just as in the case of the brain or 
the computer, anchoring creativity in more technical or cognitive domains was not 
considered entirely ‘representative’ for creative phenomena.  
The lightbulb nevertheless was better received than the puzzle, although less well 
appreciated on the whole compared to more artistic symbols (paintbrush and colours, 
children’s drawings, etc.). So the title question of whether the lightbulb as a consec-
rated image of creativity is still “on” can be answered positively or negatively, 
depending on the comparison term. Partially to blame for its ‘moderate’ popularity 
seems to be exactly its fame. The lightbulb appeared “conventional” and “over-used” 
and this made it “rather uncreative” for a creativity symbol. On the whole though, the 
lightbulb’s link to thinking and ideas worked in its favour since “a lightbulb, to me, 
means that you were able to think outside the box, pairing up the details, and coming 
up with a solution. It takes creativity to be able to come up with a bright new idea”. 
And it is exactly the process of coming up with ‘bright’ ideas that the lightbulb stands 
for. The experience of an insight and its connection to creativity have long been 
discussed in psychology as well, where inspiration attracted the interest of both 
psychoanalysis (see Slochower, 1974) and Gestalt or cognitive psychologists (see 
Sternberg & Davidson, 1999). Both approaches came to the conclusion that a con-
siderable amount of preparatory work is needed before insights can take place. This 
is not so clear in the case of the lightbulb symbol though since “it suggests that 
creativity is an instant inspiration, that occurs as quickly as flipping a switch”.  
Besides this, the lightbulb was also disliked for saying nothing about the appli-
cation of an idea and the intentionality behind creative work (“it suits better the 
accidental discovery of an idea”). And even when it does connect to creativity, it was 
said to better represent the “academic”, “practical” or “logical” aspect of it. In many 
ways the puzzle symbol had the same ‘shortcoming’ for the participants, who thought 
“it isn’t really a symbol of creativity, more of a complex mind”. Nonetheless, despite 
its rather low ratings, the jigsaw puzzle did have some recognised advantages as an 
image of creativity. “It involves critical thinking and looking at objects in multiple 
ways”, and, in the end, “creativity is about piecing together different ideas to make a 
whole one”. Even the stages of the creative process were, for some, very well sym-
bolised by puzzle making. First, in both creativity and making a puzzle rests “an 
initial desire, wish or question”, then “you have to think outside the box and put bits 
and pieces of information together”, this requires both time and patience but, “once 
you get a good start on that jigsaw puzzle, its quick to finish. And like creativity, once 
you warm up, thoughts start to fly out of your head”. However, what can justify the 
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low rating of the puzzle symbol is the fact that most respondents focused on its 
“mechanical” side and its predictability. Puzzles were qualified as the opposite of 
creativity since “there is no invention or new insight”, “a puzzle only goes together 
one ways”. Plus the process of making a puzzle requires more intelligence and pro-
blem solving skills than creativity. The connection to these cognitive mechanisms 
seems by and large to preoccupy scientists (see Eysenck, 1994; Lubart, 2003; Runco, 
2007; Sternberg, 1999) more than laypeople, who are more inclined to just distinguish 
between the two.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The present research explored current representations of creativity in a Western con-
text with a particular focus on creativity symbols as objectifications of creativity, tell 
tale signs that lead to the very core of representational systems. As Moscovici (2000, 
p. 51) acknowledged, collectively-constructed images of an object become objects in 
themselves, they no longer just signify the object but “are what is significant”. Crea-
tivity certainly is a significant object and a study of its images among lay respondents 
comes to emphasise once more how complex and multifaceted the reality of creativity 
really is for each and every one of us. More than once, all of the eight proposed sym-
bols were criticised for not representing the whole of creativity and there is a clear 
sense that perhaps nothing could represent the whole of it. Creativity will always have 
an essence, or at least part of it, that manages to escape ‘representation’. This is valid 
for both lay and scientific efforts to understand this phenomenon. And yet, para-
doxically, it is exactly what gives vitality to the subject and keeps all possible and 
competing representations in (creative) tension with one another.  
To being with, there seems to be a deep-seated tension between at least two 
meanings of creativity: the artistic and the scientific/technical one. Rooted in Roman-
ticism and Enlightenment, respectively (Weiner, 2000), these thematised dichotomies 
continue to aliment both scientific and common-sense thinking. And yet, if there is 
anything this research testified for is the predominant tendency, at least among the 
respondents, to anchor creativity in the artistic domain: “Usually when we talk about 
creativity it is in the artistic domain so I think paintbrushes and colours symbolize 
artistic talent, which I find more strongly associated with creativity than the more 
practical/inventive creativity”. Symbols like paintbrush and colours were not only the 
most popular when rated but also the most frequent in the case of spontaneous 
associations. Creativity researchers might consider this an art bias, “a misunder-
standing of creativity that equates it with artistic talent” (Runco, 2007, p. 384; em-
phasis added). From a social representations perspective this is an understanding, an 
understanding that needs itself to be understood both in terms of its roots and its 
implications. 
And one of the most direct implications has to do with self-categorisation in 
relation to creativity. In fact, when one looks through the justifications given for the 
rating of personal creativity, many times they make explicit reference to art: “I am 
interested in the arts”, “I am no artist but I do occasionally have good ideas”, “I like 
making art but I don't have many original ideas so I don't consider myself creative”, 
“I can generate original ideas so feel creative in that sense, but lack expertise in 
drawing or playing music so I rate myself as kind of average”, etc. What comes out, 
especially from the last example, is the risk of sometimes being discouraged in 
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developing an identity as a creative person by the lack of expertise in the arts. This 
can be even more problematic if we remember that ratings for the paintbrush and 
colours symbol correlated with the heredity factor and had a negative correlation with 
the social environment one. A particular representation might emerge from this in 
which creativity is seen as more remote from actions of everyday life and everyday 
people and closer to the realm of great creators, especially artists (something also 
defined as the He-paradigm, Glăveanu, 2010). And yet, it is not always the case that 
artistic expression is represented as ‘inaccessible’. In fact, the children’s drawings 
symbol, again very much preferred, can well illustrate this since “it is the expression 
of creativity in a manner not reserved for artists but in a raw sense applicable to 
anyone”. Furthermore, numerous comments of self-ratings explored this everyday life 
dimension which portrays creativity as ordinary, natural, an integral part of people 
and actions: “My mind is constantly creating meaning as I interpret the world. In that 
sense, I am constantly creating a subjective experience. Like me, all individuals are 
inherently creative”. Also found in previous research (Karwowski, 2009), more 
people tended to consider themselves capable of ‘little-c’ creative acts rather than 
‘Big-C’ creativity.  
The present study is not without its limitations. To begin with, as in any conveni-
ence-based sampling, there might be a self-selection of participants so that those who 
are more interested in creativity and potentially think they are creative took the survey. 
Furthermore, the sample was not representative of the whole population and was 
composed more of females, persons with higher levels of education and students 
(often of psychology). While it was not the purpose of the study to make general 
claims (related to the Western context), it could be interesting in the future to develop 
comparisons between different groups using the same methodology: male and female, 
different professional categories, Easterners and Westerners, etc. In fact this kind of 
designs would be very much in tone with the social representations approach, which 
strives to connect back systems of belief to the socio-cultural context of the partici-
pants. Also as a future perspective, data could be collected using more methods, parti-
cularly helpful being the focus groups since they are equiped to capture the social 
interaction and communication aspects only inferred in survey research. 
In concluding, there is no singular representation of creativity, and this can be 
noticed both at an individual and social level, both in lay and scientific thinking. In 
effect, controversies about what creativity is and is not dominate public as well as 
scientific discourses and, as this research indicates, there are more points of connec-
tion between these than we might think. Similar kinds of questions preoccupy both 
lay respondents and creativity researchers and among them we find: Is artistic crea-
tivity different from scientific creativity? Are children creative? Do toys and com-
puters help or hinder the development of creativity? What is the relationship between 
creativity and the brain? etc. Of course there are differences in how these questions 
are answered and the context in which they are raised (a scientific reunion, a 
discussion at the local pub, an on-line survey and so on) puts certain constraints on 
the representational work and its outcomes. What transpires though from the research 
on social representations or implicit theories of creativity, independent of whether 
they are studied as a personal or a social construct, is their importance for each and 
every one of us, and especially for scientists. Sternberg (1985, p. 621) once wrote that 
“the study of implicit theories has at least as much relevance as does the study of 
explicit theories, and perhaps even more relevance”. This is especially true in the case 
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of creativity which all of us, implicitly and explicitly, individually and socially, are 
making constant efforts to represent.     
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